MQM and Karachi Crises

(By Mir Murtaza Bhutto)

Have often been asked by news reporters whether I consider the M Q M to be a political party. The dilemma inherent in this question is obvious. If 1 answer in the negative then I condemn to irrelevance a political entity that consistently wins 14 seats in the National Assembly and 27 seats in the Sindh provincial Assembly (thereby making it the third biggest party at the center and the second biggest in Sindh), If, alliteratively, I accept them purely as a political party, then I would appear to condone the violence that invariably accompanies their strike calls, their bloody internal vendetta with the Haqqiqi faction and their propensity to savage innocent non – Mohajirs each time they develop a grouse against the government.

This predicament of mine is shared by the MQM on a much greater scale. The problem with the M Q M, the mainsprings from which develop their character as well as their thought, are both real as well as psychological.

Needless to say, the MQM,s constituency of choice is the Mohajirs. In that constituency, which they have deliberately limited themselves to, they have been astoundingly successful. Not only do they command a virtual monopoly of Mohajir votes but, also, they have built up a remarkably well-organized political machine. Both men and women of all ages comprise their cadre. They are disciplined as well as highly motivated.

Having achieved that, where else is there to go? Even if every single Mohajir was to vote for them, they would still be where they are today: a party with a capacity to win 14 seats in the National Assembly (out of over 200) and 27 seats in the Sindh Assembly (out of 109). Being confined to the Mohajir constituency, they have no prospect of enhancing their numerical strength in terms if legislatures. By intentionally limiting their constituency, they have, as a political entity, condemned themselves to a permanent minority status. As a result, they have deprived themselves of what every political party ultimately seeks an opportunity to form a government of their very own. This breeds in them a sense of frustration and reinforces the same insecurities that led to the creation of the MQM in the first place.

The MQM's rejection of the findings of the last census coupled with its claim to represent 50 per cent of Sindh,s population is a clear manifestation of its ambition to achieve numerical parity on grounds that are, intuitively as well as empirically, apocryphal in nature.

Also, their demand for the full repatriation of Biharis from Bangladesh, with all its other horrendous ramifications, stems from a desire to bolster their numbers in the Assemblies. Moreover, their dangerous flirtation with the concept of a separate Mohajir province is acknowledgment enough that they will never otherwise be in a position of undivided power even in a provincial government.

Thus a sense of siege, already inherent in any minority status, is confirmed by the knowledge that they can be in a position of power only through the process of compromise with other political parties. Psychologically, the very concept of compromise for minorities is a traumatically challenging notion. It further insulates them, their feeling and their fears. In their perception, compromise becomes tantamount to surrender and reconfirms the siege syndrome Alienation, a natural by-product of the siege mentality, then evokes illusions of deprivation and of general neglect.

Well-knit, chauvinistic organizations feed and thrive on the perception of suffering among their own. (The word chauvinism here is not used for the purpose of polemics, but in its strict application in that it is used to describe a movement advocating extreme or aggressive nationalism). The operative word here is frustration. For an ideologically militant organization to have reached the limits of popular acclaim and yet to have eluded undiluted authority, it is only natural for them to consider complimenting their ballot power by other means. Under the circumstances, what better compliment could there be to their popular authority than firepower?

Unlike the ballot, however, the bullet can be increased both qualitatively as well as quantitatively, whenever the highly organized MQM so desire.

When wielded by committed nationalists violence comes not only to compliment popular support but also to dominate it. Their constituency of choice having placed inherent limits on what can be achieved by voting power, the militants of a militant party then place greater premium on the use of force. This tilt towards violence has logic of its own which is contagious and which rapidly seduces the entire party apparatus. Hence, you have an armed MQM whose militants as well as their policies and deeds are proudly and publicly endorsed by the party's legislators, intellectuals as well as its various policy committees.

So much, very briefly, for one aspect of the problem. It is necessary here to assess how the present government has endeavored to solve the Karachi crisis, the pivot of which as always remains the MQM.

A) The puppet Chief Minister of Sindh and the psychologically wrecked federal Interior Minister convinced each other, and then the Prime Minister, that violence in Karachi was limited to only its central District.

B) Grudgingly, it was accepted by the Prime Minister that there existed a "mini-insurgency’’ and, later, it was acknowledged that this was, in fact, a civil war raging in this port city.

C) In response, the government abandoned its paralyzing "non-policy" and launched a massive crackdown. The Sindh Police, Rangers and the Frontier Constabulary were all thrown into action.

D) Finally, amidst unabated violence, Naseerullah Babar nauseatingly repeated the claim to have crushed the MQM while, paradoxically, his boss spoke of the need for a gradual, phased "cease-fire’’ with that same entity.

Historically, no single issue has ever given birth to rebellion. Revolt is always the product of a multiplicity of grievances (though one single issue often acts as a catalyst setting the insurgency in motion). Since the trouble springs from varied causes and diverse origins, it is only natural that a single dimensional response will prove inadequate in overcoming a deep crisis. Indeed, such an approach usually exacerbates the problem.

The Karachi crisis, likewise, is a multifaceted one. It is plagued by a civil war within the MQM, an MQM clash with the government, land and drug Mafia's running amok, and a police force which itself has become an active participant in this unfortunate city's criminal underworld. Add to this an illegal immigrant population of some three million mostly jobless people (hence inclined to crime) and you have the makings of another Beirut bursting at the seams.

The government must tackle each one of these elements wisely and firmly. Neither wisdom nor disciplines, however, are possible in a body politic reeking to high heaven of corruption. Any serious attempt at rectifying the Karachi tragedy pre-supposes a clean and committed administration. This is so because it is vital to bulldoze wide-ranging reforms in an under-trained, under-paid, demoralized, corrupt and criminalised police. This, by force of logic and nature, is beyond the pale of a morally loose administration.

The substantial measures needed to reform the police force are not impeded by lack of manpower. We have a vast army of educated but unemployed youth. This writer has repeatedly been approached by B.A. and M.A. science graduates desperate enough to take any job, even that of a chowkidar, if it could be got without paying a hefty bribe.

These graduates can rapidly replace the fat and flabby police officers known for their cruelty and corruption. An intelligence system is already in place, which enables the SHO to know all that is requested to know in his jurisdiction. Not only will these educated young men bring some efficiency and polish to their job, they will, hopefully, also carry some idealism and the motivation that it inspires.

The core administrative solution to the Karachi law and order problem lies in a clean and efficient police force. It is their job to arrest terrorists, to smash drug traffickers and land and weapon Mafia's and to neutralize an alarmingly large number of illegal immigrants. This is not a job for which the Army and Rangers are trained. Indeed, the conduct of the Rangers has only compounded the problem. Collective punishment of entire localities is the stuff from which insurgencies grow. And, in their search for terrorists, this is precisely what the Rangers have been doing. In their search operations, the law enforcement Agencies has been laying siege to entire localities inhabited by tens of thousands of people. Doors are then broken down, the women humiliated the young and old alike taken out and made to lie face down on the streets. Young "suspects’’ are herded into trucks for "intensive interrogation’’. At the end of the day, if the law enforcers manage to arrest a terrorist or two-a highly dubious proposition by all accounts-what they certainly do achieve is the creation of many, many more terrorists from among those they have so thoroughly humiliated.

Collective punishment results in the alienation of an entire populace. And alienation is a prerequisite for membership to a militant party. What is necessary instead is a highly trained police force relying on sophisticated and verifiable intelligence, operating against selective identified targets removed from the daily routine of the general population. No society can claim to be a civilized one if it does not have an independent judiciary. A vital element in a fair judicial system is the due process of law where justice is not only done but is also seen to have been done. Insurgencies, being revolts against the status quo, are illegal in the eyes of the established order. The insurgents themselves, however, view the status quo to be unacceptable and hence, consider the prevailing law itself to be illegitimate. This frame of mind removes the moral inhibition on the use of force by the rebels. No such condition exists for the state as its framework of law provides its very moral and legal foundation. Therefore, the temptation to emulate the rebel must not incite and corrupt the state into adopting extra – constitutional measures in confronting the insurgency.

The rebels seek to destroy the foundation of the state. This they do by attacking its vital institutions. If the state itself shackles the judiciary, indulges in kidnapping, disappearances and cold-blooded murder, then it is merely helping the terrorists do his job of undermining state institutions.

Just as when the terrorist becomes legal, terrorism ceases, so much so, then, when the state turns terrorist, terrorism flourishes. In this manner, the day the state adopts terrorism, it begins to loose the war against terrorism. Under Nasserullah Baber’s flamboyant guidence, this is precisely what is taking place in Karachi today. State terrorism competing with street terrorism to obliterate all semblance of an organized and coherent society.

If in its fights against terrorism, the state indulges in extra-judicial killings, it conveys to the rebels that they should expect from it no quarter. When the insurgent begins to believe that he will die violently no matter what, then a great premium is added to the utility of suicide operations. The irresistible logic here is that if I am going to die anyway I might as well cause as much destruction as I possibly can in the process.

The last thing Karachi needs is a Kamikaze bomber driving explosive-laden trucks into the hearts of our state institutions. This frightening by- product of extra-judicial killings must not be underestimated. Here it is relevant to recall that it was only a handful of such suicide bombers that drove the Americans and Israelis out of Lebanon, inflicting on the latter its first major military defeat (from which it has yet to recover in psychological terms).

Selective and decisive administrative measures are not only essential to combat urban guerilla warfare, they are also a precondition for the application of a political solution without which no insurgency can be permanently overcome.

Once a semblance of order has been restored in the city and the illegal immigrants are banished, the provincial government must conduct a census to determine the size of the population. After that, the Local Bodies election must be held without delay. Political power at the municipality level, the ability to redress local problems, will provide the MQM with a sense of participation and effective relevance which is necessary to counter their sense of alienation and frustration. It will overcome their central grievance, which consists of a feeling of political deprivation.

This, here, is the crux of the problem generally referred to as the "Karachi crises". Invariably, many worthy souls from both sides of the divide will find fault in this brief analysis for not having addressed issues such as the quota system, uneven job facilities, disproportionate civic amenities and the like. These subjects are relevant in an socio-economic debate but peripheral in trying to understand the anarchy in Karachi. Also, for the immediate purpose, I have tried to avoid polemics in order to concentrate on the central issue.

At heart is an uncaring despotic and corruption- ridden government presiding over a directionless and increasingly chaotic country. Karachi, the symbol of this all – consumes decay, needs not songs but decisive action. Until then everybody, please cry for Karachi.
 

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